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The Case for Contraceptives: The Legislative 
History of the ACA’s Birth Control Mandate
Abstract
This paper seeks to outline the legislative and judicial history of the Affordable Care Act’s
contraception coverage mandate. It begins by explaining the justifications and specifications of
the provision. It then highlights the three phases of litigation that have surrounded the mandate:
closely held, for-profit companies; religious nonprofit organizations; and state attorney generals.
This paper provides context for the litigation by describing the opposing stances towards the
mandate of the Obama and Trump Administrations and the different modifications to the
provision made under each administration. In the wake of last week’s finalization of the
controversial rules the Trump Administration issued, this paper dissects lingering judicial
questions about the mandate that are sure to resurface in coming litigation. Finally, I conclude
with an urge for the reader to consider if women’s health is being granted the status it deserves.
Julia Grant 
Honors Candidate for B.A. Public Policy & B.A. Economics 
Reviewed by Dr. Melissa Bass 
Associate Professor of Public Policy Leadership 
Humanities 
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Introduction
On March 23, 2010, as President 
Barack Obama signed the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
into law, one has to wonder if he knew 
of the legal challenges in its future, or of 
the efforts of the future Administration to 
dismantle the legislation that defined his 
tenure as President. Nevertheless, since 
its enactment, the ACA has been subject 
to a slew of litigation and torrents of crit-
icism from the Republican Party. One of 
the provisions that has proven to be the 
most controversial is the mandate that 
health insurance plans cover the full cost 
of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved contraceptive methods (Law et 
al., 2016), which has inspired hundreds of 
employers to file suit in federal court on the 
basis of infringement of religious freedom. 
The policies of the Trump Administration 
have sought to protect these plaintiffs by 
expanding exemptions to employers who 
object to providing birth control, but have 
likewise motivated lawsuits of their own. 
This paper seeks to review thehistory and 
content of the litigation surrounding the 
contraception mandate; further, it will high-
light lingering judicial questions on the mat-
ter and discuss potential arguments that 
should arise in future rounds oflitigation.
Background of Policy: 
The Affordable Care Act
Upon the passage of the ACA 
in 2010, women’s preventive care was 
deemed a primary priority. The essential 
components of preventive care were enu-
merated by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), 
which advised the government to require, 
among other provisions, private health in-
surance plans to cover all FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods without cost shar-
ing. The IOM (2011) concluded that free 
availability to birth control is required to 
“ensure women’s health and well-being” 
(pg. 1). Prior to the ACA, birth control cov-
erage was widely present in private health 
insurance plans; however, it was not uni-
versal, nor did it come without cost- shar-
ing (Sobel, Salganicoff, & Gomez, 2018). 
Since the passage of the ACA, millions of 
women have benefited from the contra-
ception mandate; a report from the IMS In-
stitute for Healthcare Informatics revealed 
that 5.1 million women in 2013 received 
oral contraceptives with no copay, com-
pared to just 1.2 million in 2012 (Burke & 
Simmons, 2014).
However, public comments on the 
potential for the mandate to infringe upon 
employers’ religious freedoms led federal 
agencies to incorporate both an exemp-
tion and accommodation into the provision 
(Salganicoff, 2016). That is, employers that 
were distinctly religious (i.e., a church) were 
altogether exempt from the mandate; oth-
er non-profit religious organizations with 
religious objections could qualify for an 
accommodation, in which insurers or plan 
administrators would provide contracep-
tion to employees, and employers would 
not be“required to contract, arrange, pay, 
or refer for contraceptive coverage” (Birth 
Control Benefits, n.d., n.p.). Yet, the ac-
commodation was not extensive enough 
for two different sects of opposition, for 
two distinct reasons: for-profit companies, 
which could not qualify for the accommo-
dation and demanded to; and religious 
nonprofits, which argued they were enti-
tled to a full exemption (Salganicoff, 2016). 
These two streams of opposition were 
manifested in high-profile lawsuits; they 
will be discussed in the following section.
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Litigation and Adjustments Under the 
Obama Administration
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
The owners of Hobby Lobby are 
the devoutly evangelical David and Barba-
ra Green, who have incorporated religious 
practices into their business; Hobby Lob-
by’s purpose statement includes “honor-
ing the Lord in all we do by operating the 
company in a manner consistent with Bib-
lical principles” (Hobby Lobby, n.d., n.p.). 
Because the Greens believe life begins at 
conception, they oppose four of the contra-
ceptive methods on the FDA-approved list, 
as they might prevent the implantation of a 
fertilized egg. These four methods include 
two methods of emergency contraception 
and two types of intrauterine devices (Bur-
well v. Hobby Lobby, 2014). Yet, due to the 
contraception mandate, the Greens were 
required by law to provide these methods 
to their employees. Because Hobby Lob-
by is a for-profit corporation, it was not 
entitled to either the exemption or the ac-
commodation. Thus, in 2012, Hobby Lob-
by filed suit against the provision, which 
was later heard and decided by the United 
States Supreme Court (Duke,2015). On 
June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of Hobby Lobby, upholding its right 
to an accommodation on the basis of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
(Religious Exemptions, 2017). The RFRA 
bars the government from “substantially 
burdening” free exercise of religion through 
regulations or penalties, unless it is doing 
so to advance a “compelling government 
interest,” and is employing the least re-
strictive approach to do so (Stahl & Lynch, 
2017). Following this decision, the Obama 
administration altered its policies, allowing 
closely- held, for-profit businesses to qual-
ify for the accommodation; a closely-held 
corporation is one that “is not a nonprofit; 
has no publicly traded ownership interests; 
and has more than 50% of the value of its 
ownership interest owned directly or indi-
rectly by 5 or fewer individuals” (Sobel, Sal-
ganicoff, & Gomez, 2018, n.p.).
Zubik v. Burwell
The accommodation was not suffi-
cient for some religiously affiliated nonprofits 
that already qualified for it. Across the na-
tion, nonprofits began filing suit, arguing that 
the accommodation, while removing their 
responsibility to pay for the birth control, 
did not protect them from complicity in sup-
plying contraceptive methods that violated 
their religious beliefs (Salganicoff, 2016). Of 
the suits, seven were consolidated into Zu-
bik v. Burwell and heard before the United 
States Supreme Court.
As in Hobby Lobby, the plaintiffs in 
Zubik cited the RFRA in their opposition to 
the contraceptive mandate (Sobel, Salgan-
icoff, & Gomez, 2018). They claimed that 
the accommodation substantially burdened 
their free practice of religion, as “the contra-
ceptive coverage is ‘triggered’ by their no-
tice, and the insurer or third party adminis-
trator utilizes their employer plan to provide 
the objectionable coverage” (Salganicoff, 
2016, n.p.). The “notice” the plaintiffs were 
referring to was the paperwork they had to 
submit that stipulated their objection to pro-
viding contraceptive coverage (Salganicoff, 
2016). After hearing oral arguments, the 
Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion 
on May 16, 2016, remanding the decision 
back to the lower courts, imploring the par-
ties involved to devise a scheme that bal-
ances freedom of religion with the seamless 
provision of contraceptives (Zubik v. Bur-
well, 2016). On January 9, 2017, the De-
Humanities 
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partment of Health and Human Services is-
sued a statement saying it had been unable 
over the past year to conceive of such a 
compromise (Religious Exemptions, 2017); 
nine months later, it dramatically changed 
course, with the publication of the Trump 
Administration’s Interim Final Guidelines.
New Guidelines of the Trump 
Administration
The inaugural year of the Trump Ad-
ministration came with an executive about-
face on women’s contraceptive access. In 
October of 2017, the Departments of Health 
and Human Services, Labor, and the Trea-
sury issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR) on reli-
gious exemptions and accommodations for 
the contraceptive mandate under the ACA. 
The purpose of issuing the new rules was 
to drastically extend the exemption in both 
scope and justification. Under the rules, the 
exemption applied to nonprofit and for-profit 
employers, insurers, and private universities 
or colleges that had a religious objection to 
the coverage. Most radically, the rules also 
extended the exemption to nonprofit or 
closely held for-profit employers, insurers, 
and private colleges or universities with just 
a moral objection to contraceptives. The-
accommodation still exists; however, it is 
now merely offered as an option to those 
employers who qualify for an exemption al-
ready (Birth Control Benefits, n.d.; California 
v. HHS, 2017; Religious Exemptions, 2017; 
Sobel, Salgnicoff, & Gomez, 2018). Sud-
denly, the tables had turned; those cham-
pions of the increased access to birth con-
trol under the Obama Administration found 
themselves filing suits against the Trump Ad-
ministration, which had completely inverted 
the executive stance on the mandate. As a 
judge in a subsequent lawsuit on the matter 
wrote in his opinion, the Interim Final Rules 
“represent an abandonment of the [Depart-
ments’] prior position with regard to the 
contraceptive coverage requirement, and 
a reversal of their approach to striking the 
proper balance between substantial gov-
ernmental and societal interests” (California 
v. HHS, 2017,pg.2).
The New Face of Litigation Under 
Trump
Nearly immediately following the 
publication of the IFR, a group of Demo-
cratic state attorneys from eight states and 
four nonprofits filed suit in federal court 
(Hackman, 2017), alleging the new rules 
infringe upon the Civil Rights Act and the 
First Amendment (Carter, 2017). Washing-
ton Attorney General Bob Ferguson, one 
of the plaintiffs, writes, “The Civil Rights Act 
prohibits discrimination against women 
based on sex or the capacity to be preg-
nant.
 The rules result in women having 
less access to reproductive health care, 
which is discrimination based on their 
gender” (Carter, 2017, n.p.). Two cases 
in the federal district courts of California 
and Pennsylvania resulted in the judges 
issuing preliminary injunctions, effectively 
preventing the IFR from going into effect 
(Keith, 2018). Both of these cases have 
been appealed to their respective circuit 
courts, and will likely advance to the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Sobel, Salganicoff, & Go-
mez, 2018). Thus, the litigation enters into 
its third phase, as the Government takes a 
new side, and women’s access to contra-
ceptives becomes subject to judges, pres-
idents, employers, and bureaucrats.
IFR Finalized
Despite the surrounding judicial tur-
moil, on November 7, 2018, the Trump-
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administration finalized its IFR, effectively 
extending the exemption to nearly any em-
ployer who can justify a moral aversion to 
contraceptives. The Departments issued 
the religious and moral exemptions sepa-
rately, the first providing the exemption to 
“entities that object to services covered by 
the mandate on the basis of sincerely held 
religious beliefs,” and the second providing 
“protections to nonprofit organizations and 
small businesses that have non-religious 
moral convictions opposing services cov-
ered by the mandate” (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services [HHS], 2018, 
n.p.). The Departments emphasize that 
the new procedures do not affect existing 
government operations, such as commu-
nity health centers, that issue free or sub-
sidized contraceptive coverage to low-in-
come women. Further, they claim that the 
new exemptions “should affect no more 
than approximately 200 employers with 
religious or moral objections” (HHS, 2018, 
n.p.).
Yet, it is clear that the fight is not 
over. Proponents of seamless coverage 
of birth control vow to see the provision 
rectified by the court, and they reject the 
statistic the Administration proposed that 
claimed just 200 employers would be af-
fected. Fatima Goss Graves, the president 
of the National Women’s Law Center, has 
spurned the new provisions, saying, “If the 
Administration thinks it can move these 
rules forward without a fight, they’re wrong. 
Countless women depend on this critical 
birth control coverage for their health and 
economic stability— and we will contin-
ue to fiercely defend them” (Mosbergen, 
2018, n.p.). As the battle over birth control 
continues, it is important to consider the 
judicial questions that remain unanswered, 
the opposing statutes at play, and how le-
gal arguments will evolve in the wake of 
the finalization of Trump’s rules. These will 
be considered in the next section.
The Judicial Future of the Contraceptive 
Coverage Mandate
As the new battle lines are drawn 
between the Administration and religious or 
“moral” employers, and those proponents 
of seamless contraceptive coverage, it is 
critical to define what precisely is coming 
to a head. The Trump Administration and 
its supporters have extended the exemp-
tion to objecting employers; opponents 
claim this violates the First Amendment 
and the Civil Rights Act. Champions of the 
contraceptive movement would like to see 
at the very least a compromise between 
religious freedom and seamless contra-
ception—hence, the accommodation
—but opponents claim any imposition of 
the mandate violates the RFRA. Each of 
these statutes comes with a myriad of con-
stitutional interpretations and judicial prece-
dent that will surely factor into the Supreme 
Court’s ultimate decision, if and when it de-
cides to hear the pending cases.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
First, it is imperative the Court ad-
dress the lingering questions of the RFRA 
that remain unresolved since Zubik. Recall 
again the components of the RFRA, which 
reads that the “Government shall not sub-
stantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion” unless “it demonstrates that ap-
plication of the burden to the person is in 
furtherance of a compelling government 
interest and is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling government 
interest” (Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993, 2018).
Humanities 
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Does the accommodation substantially
 burden the religious exercise of em-
ployers?
Prior to Zubik, over 100 nonprofit organi-
zations claimed that the accommodation 
to the contraceptive mandate does indeed 
substantially burden their religious freedom 
(Sobel, Salganicoff, & Gomez, 2018). The 
Court, however, failed to endorse or refute 
this position in Zubik (Epps, 2016), instead 
taking a more practical approach, mandat-
ing the parties reach a compromise (Stahl 
& Lynch, 2017), leaving the question unset-
tled. Moving forward, proponents of contra-
ceptive coverage must either devise a su-
perior compromise between the exemption 
and the accommodation, convince the Su-
preme Court that the accommodation is not 
a substantial burden to religiously objecting 
employers, or convince the Supreme Court 
that, although the accommodation may im-
pose a substantial burden, it is justified by a 
compelling government interest.
Does the government have a com-
pelling interest in mandating employers 
provide contraceptives against their reli-
gious beliefs? The Obama Administration 
cited three primary compelling interests 
in upholding the contraceptive mandate: 
gender equality, female autonomy, and 
public health. First, the Administration ar-
gued that access to contraceptive meth-
ods advanced gender equality by permit-
ting women to control when they would 
have a child and how many they would 
have, thus allowing them to be equally in-
volved and competitive in the workforce 
(Stahl & Lunch, 2017). Further, the man-
date allows women control over their own 
bodies that is not subject to an employer’s 
discretion. It also reduces the number of 
unwanted pregnancies and diseases pre-
vented by contraceptive methods, and is 
thus an important factor in the preserva-
tion public health (Sobel, Salganicoff, & 
Gomez, 2018). In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
(2014), however, the Court decided such 
generalities would be insufficient in future 
cases, and instead the compelling interest 
needed to be justified in requiring partic-
ular employers to provide contraceptives.
The Trump Administration, howev-
er, has been clear on its position that the 
coverage of birth control does not serve a 
compelling government interest. It points 
to the millions of women enrolled in grand-
fathered plans, which are all legally exempt 
from the contraceptive mandate (Religious 
Exemptions, 2017). Further, it emphasizes 
the existence of many federal, state, and 
local programs that already provide free or 
subsidized contraceptives for low-income 
women, and argues, “the availability of 
such programs to serve the most at-risk 
women diminishes the Government’s in-
terest in applying the Mandate to objecting 
employers” (Religious Exemptions, 2017, 
pg. 47803). In addition, the Departments 
argue that imposing the contraceptive 
mandateon objecting organizations will not 
even benefit the women who are the most 
prone to experiencing unplanned preg-
nancies—women who are unmarried, 18-
24 years old, low-income, lack education, 
or are part of a minority group (Religious 
Exemptions, 2017; Institute of Medicine, 
2011). Thus, the Trump Administration ar-
gues, the compelling interest to impose 
such a mandate on religiously or morally 
objecting employers is lacking.
Is there a less restrictive way of en-
suring women have access to free con-
traceptive methods without cost-sharing 
than the accommodation?
 In Zubik, the nonprofits claimed that 
less restrictive ways to provide contracep-
tives to women existed, such as permitting 
Grant, The Case for Contraceptives 
50
University of Mississippi Undergraduate Resarch Journal 
UMURJ | Volume III | Spring 2019 
these employees to receive subsidies on 
the health insurance exchange to enroll in 
acontraceptive-only plan, or by taking ad-
vantage of Title X, which provides feder-
al funds for family planning. In response, 
however, the Obama Administration con-
tended that these methods would impose 
“financial, logistical, informational, and ad-
ministrative burdens” on women (Priests 
for Life, et al. vs. HHS, 2014, pg. 66). In 
a concurrence to the per curiam order in 
Zubik, Justice Sotomayor points out that 
such “contraceptive-only plans” are cur-
rently nonexistent and could even run con-
trary to federal law (Zubik v. Burwell, 2016). 
The Court will either have to decide that 
the accommodation is the least restrictive 
way to provide seamless coverage with-
out imposing disproportionate costs on 
women, or the parties will once more be 
called to devise a less restrictive method 
that balances interests. I believe that such 
a compromise could entail altering the 
ACA requirements to remove mandatory 
coverage of the copper intrauterine de-
vice, which is the only method of the four 
alleged abortifacients that has been shown 
to prevent the implantation of a fertilized 
egg (Carmon,2014).
The Civil Rights Act and The Constitu-
tionality of a “Moral Objection”
On the opposite side of the issue, 
arguments remain to be fully shaped, as 
the appellate cases have not yet been 
heard. Yet, opponents’ strength should lie 
in two primary arguments: the unconstitu-
tionality of the so-called “moral” exemp-
tion, and the violation of the Civil Rights 
Act on the basis of discrimination of sex.
First, opponents should argue that 
the moral exemption is an attack on the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, 
which prohibits the government from en-
acting any law “respecting an establish-
ment of religion” (Carlson, 2017). The At-
torney General of California, who filed suit 
under the interim rule, has contended that 
the moral exemption is so broad that the 
government is effectively favoring “one re-
ligion over another, or religion over
irreligion,” (Board of Education of Kiryas 
Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 
1994, pg. 703; Butash, 2017), which has 
been prohibited by the Courts on the ba-
sis of the Establishment Clause. The ACLU 
(n.d.) has likewise contended, “While reli-
gious freedom gives us all the right to our 
beliefs, it doesn’t give institutions or indi-
viduals the right to impose their belief on 
others or to discriminate” (n.p.). By making 
the moral exemption so generalized, the 
Government is unduly prioritizing the mor-
al convictions of employers over women’s 
accessibility to health care, in violation of 
the Establishment Clause. After estab-
lishing the overreach of the exemption, 
opponents must argue that the interests 
behind providing contraceptive coverage 
are significant and worthy of governmen-
tal action. This should be accomplished by 
pointing out that coverage of contracep-
tives is fundamentally a question of civil 
rights and equal protection under the law.
For this contention, opponents 
should point to a key Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruling in 
December 2000. In this case, the EEOC 
(2000) mandated that employers who 
provided prescription drug coverage to 
their employees must also cover contra-
ceptive methods, lest they be found in vi-
olation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. Title VII prevents discrimination on 
the basis of sex. This argument should 
be extended to the present-day scenar-
io. Refusing to cover contraceptive meth-
Humanities 
51
ods, which are both a critical component 
of female preventive care and a facilitator 
of unobstructed female participation and 
advancement in the workforce, solely pe-
nalizes women and puts female employ-
ees ata disadvantage in comparison to 
their malecounterparts.
Conclusion
This paper outlined each phase of 
litigation surrounding the contraceptive 
mandate of the ACA: for-profit companies 
demanding an accommodation, nonprof-
its demanding an exemption, state attor-
neys general opposing expanded exemp-
tions, and future litigants likely to emerge 
after the passage of the final rules, just last 
week. It then addressed the remaining ju-
dicial questions the Supreme Court will be 
ultimately responsible for resolving and dis-
cussed potential precedent today’s plain-
tiffs should consider employing. Now, I turn 
to the more fundamental issue of women’s 
health becoming both a political pawn and 
a matter whose quality is so closely tied to 
unaffected persons in power. I remind the 
reader to remember that women’s access 
to contraceptives is not merely a matter 
of Constitutional language, administra-
tive jargon, and bureaucratic loopholes. A 
woman’s decision to use contraceptives is 
one often approached with great consid-
eration, as she weighs the hormonal im-
balance some methods could impose up-
onher body with her desire to live without 
fear of becoming pregnant, thus altering 
the course of her life. It is maddening and 
terrifying, then, if a woman must also be 
forced to consider if her government will 
suddenly decide that she is not entitled to 
those contraceptives anylonger.
Therefore, once all of the judicial 
backlash has quelled, we must revisit the 
question of severity regarding whether 
women’s health meets parity with the per-
manence of the regulations surrounding it. 
Further, we must reevaluate how we bal-
ance our priorities. As noted by Stahl & 
Lynch (2017), religion is something that is 
fundamentally pervasive and guiding in a 
person’s life—but then, of course, so is that 
person’s health. Why have we convinced 
ourselves it is necessary to sacrifice one for 
the other?
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